Introduction
Ministers leave office for all sorts of reasons. The most dramatic exits are those that are forced. We define a forced exit as one that happens at a time not of the prime minister's choosing. The prime minister might demand a resignation because of some scandal, but she did not want that scandal to emerge and compel her to ask for the minister's resignation. A forced resignation can also occur when a minister resigns because they disagree with government policy, because of a personality clash or simply as part of a strategic ploy to enhance his or her own leadership ambitions. We do not include cases where a minister is asked to leave at a time of the prime minister's choosing-for example, John Howard's penchant for asking ministers to step down during the Christmas break (see below and Chapter 2). Forced exits therefore include cases of what Woodhouse (1994, 33-8) calls 'sacrificial responsibility'-part of individual ministerial responsibility, but also where ministers depart of their own volition because they cannot abide by collective cabinet responsibility.
In this chapter we examine the pattern of individual resignations in the Australian Commonwealth Government since 1949, from the incoming Menzies Government to the end of Kevin Rudd in 2010. We have collected data on all resignations and non-resignations over the period (see below and Appendix 6.1 for details). Our analysis is largely descriptive, to examine the lie of the land, so to speak. But one of our aims is to see whether the pattern of forced exits has changed over time.
Many commentators believe that Australian prime ministers are too reluctant to sacrifice ministers following scandal (Mulgan 2002) . John Howard was particularly criticised for his reluctance to dispose of ministers in his later years in office. In a letter to the Herald-Sun (12 November 2007), two former prime ministers, Gough Whitlam and Malcolm Fraser, wrote:
In the last two decades the constitutional principle that ministers should be held accountable for the failings of their policies or administration has been seriously undermined.
No matter how grave their failings may be, ministers no longer resign.
Academic commentators are more circumspect. Page (1990) and Thompson and Tillotsen (1999) have documented when Australian federal ministers have resigned, but they also note that it has never really been the Australian tradition for ministers to resign for departmental or policy failings (nor indeed has it been in other Westminster systems: see, for example, Dowding and Kang 1998; McLeay 1995, Ch. 5; Woodhouse 1994) . Indeed, as Richard Mulgan points out in Chapter 9, the textbook account of ministerial responsibility means that all prime ministers are bound to fail it. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile examining the pattern of forced exit over time to see whether we can discern changes in how prime ministers respond to criticism of their ministers. In order to do that we need to look not only at cases where ministers do resign, but also those where they do not.
Calls to Resign
Sacrificial responsibility is the ultimate public face of ministerial accountability and, as the letter from Whitlam and Fraser suggests, is often thought to be the mark of ministerial responsibility. One way of ensuring that a prime minister's government looks unaccountable is, however, to make lots of calls for resignation. It is clear from our data that many calls are trivial. Rather than use our own subjective judgment about what is trivial and what important, we chose to use our source as a guide. From our original data-which collected all calls for resignation from parliamentarians, elite figures, organisations such as trade unions or from newspaper columnists-we culled those that were not repeated in the media over two or more days. So we only report here cases where the media reported the call and then discussed the issue over several days. We do not claim that all of the cases in the data reported here are 'objectively serious' but we have excluded many cases that are clearly trivial. 1 Figure 6 .1 demonstrates that the number of resignation calls has increased over time (and that increase is even larger if the trivial items are included). Later we will categorise these calls and see where they have been increasing. Figure 6 .1 shows a sharp rise in the early 1970s, corresponding with Whitlam's administration, and a further rise under Fraser. We also see large rises under Howard's administration. The figure shows the actual number of calls annually and a smoothed trend line. The trend line is important as it demonstrates how parliamentarians, elites and the media are more likely to call for resignations over time. The trend line falls towards the end but it is too soon to tell if this is a temporary or more permanent phenomenon. 
Proximate Causes of Forced Exit
In this chapter we are examining the proximate causes of forced exit-that is, the specific events that led to a minister resigning at the time he did. Proximate causes are contrasted with ultimate causes, which would include factors shown to have been important in ministerial turnover, such as the age of the minister, previous scandals in cabinet, the relative popularity of the government in the polls, and so on (Berlinski et al. 2007 (Berlinski et al. , 2010 (Berlinski et al. , 2012 Dewan and Dowding 2005) . Our aim is to describe the proximate causes of forced exit, examining trends over time, not to explain the ultimate causes and underlying conditions that lead to forced exit.
It would be a mistake to examine only ministerial resignations when attempting to identify the proximate cause of forced exits. Selecting the dependent variable might lead one to conclude that certain proximate factors lead to resignation when in fact a very small percentage of such cases leads to resignation. To overcome that fact we have coded all cases from 1947 to 2010 where there has been a call for a minister to resign. Such 'resignation issues' are composed of resignations and 'non-resignations' where a call has come but the minister has remained in place. The calls have been recorded from those reported in the newspapers (The Age, The Australian and the Sydney Morning Herald), and all cases have been coded according to a set of categories (see Appendix 6.1 for details of the coding methods).
In this chapter we consider a minister to be anyone with ministerial responsibility reporting to either house, thus including people in both inner and outer ministries. Figure 6 .2 compares the number of resignations with non-resignations by government; we have removed those short-term governments with no resignations or non-resignations. There appears to be no particular pattern to the resignations: some parliaments have few, others 10 or so. But it is clear that the number of non-resignations has increased dramatically over time. There are some peaks in the mid-1970s-notably the fiftieth government (Whitlam's third administration) and the fifty-third (the third Fraser administration)-but the largest rise comes with the sixtieth government (Keating's second administration), with further rises under Howard. This pattern of increasing numbers of calls for resignations matches trajectories in other countries (Dowding and Dumont 2009a; Dowding and Kang 1998; Fischer et al. 2006 ) and is certainly due in part to increased media attention to ministerial behaviour-though we note the few calls in Rudd's two and a half years. Of course, as we mentioned in the introduction, Howard was criticised for allowing standards of sacrificial accountability to slip: ministers did not resign following problems within their departments, with decisions they made or general behaviour.
There are many reasons for the increase in calls. There are a greater number of controversial issues as the policy agenda has grown, particularly since the time of Gough Whitlam (Dowding et al. 2010 ). Issues such as share-ownership and travel expenses have become controversial and worthy of press comment whereas in the past they were ignored (Dowding and Lewis 2012) . Many calls in recent years are simply appended to criticisms of ministers' policies. Furthermore, the press and opposition have become more vitriolic in their criticism. One way of considering the issue would be to look at the proportion of resignations relative to the number of calls for resignation. This has been called the 'honour ratio' (Dowding and Kang 1998) though the title is perhaps misleading given that even in our restricted set some calls for resignation might be considered mischievous. Figure 6 .4 shows the proportion by prime minister. We see here that in fact Howard has fewer calls per resignation than Keating or Menzies; however, given the small numbers and the increasing calls over time we cannot make much of this. We also put 95 per cent confidence intervals on the figure. The 95 per cent confidence intervals are estimated by the binomial distribution, which approximates a normal distribution for n larger than about 25-30, and so are not very accurate except for the Fraser, Hawke, Keating and Howard entries.
Menzies

Reasons for Resigning
What are the proximate reasons that force ministers to exit? We see in Figure  6 .5 that by far the greatest number of resignation calls relate to personal error. , following reports she had misled Parliament the previous year when she had said spot checks on nursing homes would continue when in fact they had not started; there were additionally several calls for Howard to resign following claims he had misled Parliament over the children overboard affair (Keating 2003; Marr and Wilkinson 2003; Weller 2002 ) and, earlier, over meetings with businessman Dick Honan.
The next largest category of non-resignations is financial scandal though it has the highest number of resignations. This category has the highest proportion of resignations to resignation issues (resignations and non-resignations combined), demonstrating the seriousness with which financial scandals are treated, even when relatively trivial. The earliest resignation over financial matters occurs in July 1975. Whitlam forced Jim Cairns to resign after the minister first denied and then claimed to have no memory of authorising businessman George Harris to investigate the raising of overseas loans. It was part of the loans affair that was instrumental in the fall of Whitlam's government, and the day after Cairns resigned Queensland Premier, Joh Bjelke-Petersen, called on the Coalition to demand Whitlam's resignation. Rex Connor was also caught up in the loans affair, though he was actually dismissed on the basis that he had misled the Prime Minister over continued links with Tirath Khemlani after his authority to seek overseas loans had been withdrawn. Victor Garland resigned over the relatively trivial matter of an independent senate candidate giving $500 in expenses at Garland's office. (Howard 1996) . Short owned extensive banking shares whilst being responsible for banking matters; Gibson owned bank shares, though he argued he was not responsible for banking policy. (John Moore faced calls for resignation over share-ownership at the same time, but managed to survive.) They began the series of forced exits in Howard's first administration. Santo Santoro went late in Howard's final administration for failing to register shares. Bob Woods resigned over parliamentary expenses; John Sharp and David Jull over false travel allowance claims, followed by Peter McGauran a few days later. Bruce Scott also faced calls for his resignation but weathered the storm. We include Mal Brough, though he was forced to stand down before he was sworn in as minister because of allegations of electoral rorting during a State election in Queensland. Howard relaxed his code following the rush of resignations in his first term, but they almost certainly gave a taste for blood to the Opposition and press. We will not discuss all the calls for resignation that did not lead to exit, some for relatively trivial issues, but we note that Mick Young faced such a call in July 1984 for making a false customs declaration-a similar, though perhaps not as serious, case as that which led to two ministers resigning under Fraser. John Dawkins and John Button did not resign after claims of conflict of interests. Dawkins was Minister of Trade and admitted knowing his mother owned shares in a company, and Button held shares when Minister of Technology and Commerce. Chris Hurford survived, despite a story that he had promised scoops in return for a regular radio spot on an Adelaide commercial radio station, though there is some doubt about how serious this allegation really was. John Brown did not resign after it emerged that his wife had cashed in a first-class ticket issued to her as an MP's wife for economy-class tickets for her and her sons. Bruce Scott (September 1997) We can see with regard to financial scandals that, whilst they are more likely to lead to resignations, in some cases ministers do not go even though these cases seem equally as scandalous as ones in which resignation ensues. Howard introduced his code of conduct following his criticisms of ministers in the previous administration for not declaring interests and holding shares; however, he then faced even greater problems over these issues in his own administration and later felt obliged to relax the guidelines. Sometimes resignations occur over relatively trivial sums of money, largely because ministers have been shown to have given misleading statements, and the issue of honesty rather than the original 'crime' is what leads to resignation. Of course, another issue is how important the minister is to the party and the prime minister. Ministers considered to be good or who are close to the prime minister are less likely to go than those the prime minister might be pleased to see the back of, but we do not consider that aspect of forced exits in this chapter.
Personal Error
The main categories that financial scandals fall into are: first, campaigning irregularities; second, inappropriate use of public money, such as travel rorts; and three, suspicious business activities either personally or in the minister's immediate circle. The first lead to resignations if proven; the second tend to lead to resignations, though are more acceptable if ministers can demonstrate lack of personal knowledge. Whether resignations occur in the third seems to depend upon the seriousness of the claims and whether the minister is shown to have been dishonest in his first response to the allegations. In all three areas the attitude of the prime minister and the political circumstances of the time are key determinants in how the case unfolds.
The line between a policy dispute and 'personality clash' is a fine one. In the main, policy disputes are those where policy disagreement of some sort is aired in public. We have coded some cases as policy dispute where disagreements within cabinet have been made public by the opposition or media, even though sometimes these might be of a relatively trivial nature. The normative constitutional convention is clear enough in this case. Disputes within government, even when becoming public through leaks, should not lead to resignation no matter what hostile oppositions or the media make of them. Publicising them is mischief making by opposition or the media. We have coded as personality clashes those cases where personal ambition has led to resignation. So personality clash also includes power battles between members of the cabinet, notably leadership battles.
In Australia, as in the United Kingdom and other countries, few ministers resign over 'performance' despite many calls for them to do so. Those who call for a resignation based on the poor performance of a minister rarely expect the minister actually to resign; rather the call is simply a means of getting criticism of the government into the news. We will not report the myriad cases of nonresignation, but mention here those exits we have so coded. The first is Frank Crean in November 1974. After the 1974 election, Cairns was elected Deputy Leader of the Labor Party and asserted his right to a bigger role in economic policy, eventually claiming the Treasury after Crean had been virtually sidelined over the 1974 budget. We have also included the dismissal of the Whitlam Government by the Governor-General in November 1975. There has been much debate over this controversial action, but we have simply coded it as one case due to 'performance'. We code as performance John Dawkins' resignation as Treasurer in December 1993, following months of speculation after his budget had been savaged, which he described as the worst month in his political career. Geoff Prosser resigned in July 1997, telling Prime Minister Howard that he had become a liability to the Government. As indicated above, he had survived earlier calls to resign over his business affairs but question marks remained.
Two things are notable about these data for Australia in comparison with the similar data collected for the United Kingdom. The first is the relative lack of sex scandals. We have coded one non-resignation as a sex scandal, though in truth it is a minor affair compared, for example, with the fuss made in the United Kingdom and the United States (Garment 1991; King 1986; Markovits and Silverstein 1988; Tiffen 1999) ; indeed it was not presented in the newspapers at the time as explicitly about sex. We code it thus more to make the point that sex scandals do not figure much at the federal level.
5 In fact, it was a call in February 1975 by the Country MP Ralph Hunt for Jim Cairns to resign unless there were to be a public inquiry into the appointment of Junie Morosi as Principal Private Secretary to Cairns-a post usually held at that time within the Treasury by a public servant. What is interesting about this 'sex scandal' in comparison with British and US ones is that, whilst the sexual nature of their relationship was guessed by elites in Canberra, it was not aired in the press until almost 30 years later. Australian newspapers do not seem inclined to pursue Commonwealth politicians with the zeal of their US and British counterparts-unless it is that Australian politicians are less inclined to become involved in such tawdry matters.
The second aspect of the Australian data that is particularly noticeable in relation to the United Kingdom is the necessary addition of a new category of resignation issue. In Figure 6 .5 there are five entries where there has been a call for a minister to resign over their policy (and another 42 recorded in the full set). None has done so, which is as significant as the coding itself. Ministers in Australia are much more closely aligned with specific policies than in the United Kingdom. Any such calls for resignation in the United Kingdom would be directed more at the Prime Minister for failures in government policy or possibly at the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Treasurer), or directed at more general performance issues. Specific calls for ministers to resign due to their policies-not the failure of those policies as such but their nature-are, however, common in Australia.
Conclusions
This chapter is largely descriptive, presenting some general data on ministerial resignations and non-resignations in Australia over a 60-year period. Like all such descriptive studies using data in this manner there are many judgment calls to be made over how to precisely code the events. Sometimes the point of the coding and discussion is to bring out the nature of the event and how unusual it is, such as the case of Cairns. We note that rarely do ministers resign due to 'performance', though arguably prime ministers can sometimes be thought to do so; however, such cases also involve power struggles.
There are a number of features worth noting in our findings. First, the number of resignation issues has increased dramatically over the period. (There was a falling off during the Rudd years, though it is too early to say if this is a trend.) Whilst there has been a slight increase in the number of ministers over that time, this increase cannot explain the dramatic rise. There are a number of factors that might. Whilst the standard constitutional issues-calls for resignation over personal and departmental errors, over the general performance of the minister, over policy disagreements-have been around from the start, calls for resignation (in our data set) over financial irregularities started only in the mid1970s, over personality clashes from the late 1960s (probably due to Menzies being in control for so long) and, whilst we do have one call for a minister to resign over his policies from as far back as 1959, that case is Harold Holt as Treasurer over economic policy. Calls for resignation of ministers due to their policies (we note again this is not policy failure as such, simply criticism of the policy the minister has adopted) started in the late 1960s (with three cases) and then took off dramatically from Whitlam's government in the 1970s. No minister has ever resigned after such a call.
We suggest that the increasing number of resignation issues over time is due to increased media attention, and also to Australian oppositions becoming much more ruthless as they view a potential resignation as a political prize to be pursued. Certainly the call to resign over policy has increased dramatically and is relatively unusual in world terms. With the exception of calls in the United Kingdom for the Chancellor of the Exchequer (the Treasurer, in Australia) to resign during economic crises, such calls are only made on the Prime Minister. Similarly, such calls are rare in Ireland, Germany, Belgium, Canada and other countries for which such dedicated data have been collected (Dowding and Dumont 2009a) .
We have discussed the proximate causes of resignation in terms of the reasons for the call for resignation. But we note that the attitude and political judgment of the prime minister are vital. Using Australian data, McAllister (2003) reports that resignations are correlated with falls in government popularity, and, if causal, this ought to make prime ministers reluctant to fire ministers. Dewan and Dowding (2005) , however, using British data, argue that it is the resignation issue that is bad for a government's popularity-that resignations in fact provide a corrective effect, increasing government popularity relative to what it would have been. They recognise, however, that prime ministers cannot always sack and the 'political scalp' aspect usually leads prime ministers to defend ministers unless it is clear that the public disapproves. We also note that dishonesty about an issue is often more important than the nature of the issue itself when it comes to whether a minister resigns.
In this chapter we have mapped the outlines of forced exits in the Australian Commonwealth Government in the postwar period. More detailed analysis of our data is required before we can supply a more thorough analysis of the cause of forced exits, but this overview provides a start in examining the changing nature of ministerial resignations and public perceptions about those resignations and thus the true nature of sacrificial ministerial accountability.
Appendix 6.1
All ministers from the beginning of Menzies' fourth ministry (1949) were listed. In this chapter we make no distinction between inner and outer ministries. We then carried out a systematic search for all 'resignation issues' in various newspaper databases. A 'resignation issue' is defined as any issue over which there was a call for a minister to resign by a parliamentarian, a responsible agent such as a professional organisation, lobby group or trade union, or in an editorial or column in one of our newspapers. Cases where ministers resigned prior to any public discussion also constitute resignation issues. The information was downloaded and a short descriptive paragraph of each event written up. From those descriptions all cases were coded into 10 categories: Personal Error; Departmental Error; Sexual Scandal; Financial Scandal; Policy Disagreement; Personality Clash; Performance; Other Controversy; Ill Health; Criticism of Minister's Policy. Whilst some cases had secondary as well as primary causes coded, we utilise only the primary categories in this chapter. These categories were based on those used for a similar study in the United Kingdom (Dowding and Kang 1998) though, as discussed in the text, it was necessary to create additional categories.
In some cases an issue emerges, goes away and then returns. In such cases, if there is a gap of a week or more in reporting, we code it first as a non-resignation and then as a resignation. Similarly, if two issues are bundled together, we code the earlier as a non-resignation and the second that leads to the exit as resignation.
For consistency over the period, we concentrated upon information from the Sydney Morning Herald (SMH), though for parts of the period further information (not cases) was also taken from other newspapers-notably, The Age and The Australian. The Factiva database (<Factiva.com>) was utilised to access articles from September 1986 to December 2007. The SMH was available from 1 September 1986, The Age from 19 January 1991 and The Australian with articles available from 8 July 1986. The SMH archives site (<http://archives. smh.com.au/>) was utilised for the 1955-95 period. For articles prior to 1955, information was obtained via microfiche files from the National Library of Australia's Canberra facilities. Relevant information in relation to ministerial resignations from Internet databases was obtained by typing the minister's name in Factiva followed by the word 'resign*' (for example, 'Keating resign*'). Information for the period 1949-54 was acquired though a microfiche search. All entries for individual ministers were noted from the SMH index books from the National Library of Australia, and by manually viewing the first three pages of all SMH newspapers on microfiche. All material was collected by one researcher who also initially coded the data. The coding was subsequently checked and discussed with another researcher.
